Investigate Curriculum Mapping Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Investigate Curriculum Mapping - Essay Example Figure 1: Curriculum Mapping's Directionality Image courtesy of the University of Connecticut When the mapping is done, the outcomes and philosophies of the institution (e.g. whether the school has a science focus, a vocational focus, a Deweyan learned experience focus) and the learning outcomes of the academic program (e.g. the major or the grade year or whether it's elective or main track) determine the nature of the course. The course itself is then mapped into units and individual lessons. Like any good architect, curriculum mappers start with the blueprint at the highest level then build from the lowest level, from the foundation up, brick by brick. Students may be told about the objectives and design approach, but they will experience it lesson by lesson up until the final outcomes of the institution (graduation) are achieved. Hale and Dunlap (2010, p. 2) liken it to looking at a city from a high vantage point first, getting a broad sense of its flow and design, then going down to the ground level and interacting with the individual citizens. This is all fairly intuitive thus far, but the University of Connecticut (2011) also argues for program objective-to-individual program matrices. If the institution values diversity, for example, that claim is fairly hollow unless diversity is actually represented in any classes (language classes, multicultural studies, social studies, etc.) Using the matrix design, they'd code all of the institutional goals and match them to each class: In the case of diversity, they'd match the diversity objective to social studies classes. This process is iterative and can occur multiple times: The class can in turn be broken down into objective matrices, with units and lessons mapped to make sure that there is even and full coverage of all primary objectives. The individual social studies classes, knowing that they're supposed to fulfill a diversity requirement, can orient their units and lessons appropriately. Curriculum mapping is not just a design tool: It can also be a data-collection tool as well (Kentucky Department of Education, 2011). It's difficult to collect data that's not systematized. By making systematic the way curricula are designed and taught, it's possible for teachers, instructors and administrators to quantify performance and interest and begin to adjust or improve the relevant and practicality of institutional goals. And when performance results have been achieved, it's possible to quantify why and where the improvement took place. Curriculum mapping also allows all relevant stakeholders to participate (Rubicon, 2010; Dunlap and Hale, 2010). Since the curriculum map allows the entire curriculum to be coordinated and designed, it allows instructors to make sure their efforts aren't excessively overlapping, allows parents and students to insure they're getting what they deserve and value, etc. Good curriculum mapping is flexible (Rubicon, 2010). It can be changed on the spot as teachers, students and administrators discover problems and holes. But unlike change that occurs in a more conventional way, curriculum mapping can be systematic, with a change or reduction in one classroom being offset by other changes elsewhere. If one class' diversity require

Strategies And Evaluation Of Nissan Management Essay

Strategies And Evaluation Of Nissan Management Essay In 1999 Nissan had been facing great losses for seven of the past eight years which were now resulting in debts. This was mainly caused by the Japanese business custom of keiretsu investments which left little capital for other investments, like innovations in product designs. This lack of design innovation furthermore caused the Nissan brand to weaken as competitors were producing vehicles more stylish and up to date, reflecting customer demands. To foster a turnaround the Nissan president and CEO Yoshikazu Hanawa formed a mutual beneficial strategic alliance (Global Alliance Agreement) with Renault, allowing both companies to expand in new desirable geographic areas. With his experience in turnarounds Carlos Ghosn seemed to be the obvious choice to lead the Nissan turnaround from both the Renault and Nissan point of view. Evaluation The approach was an overall success in meeting the specific and measurable goal of turning the losses into profits not only on time but 6 month prior to the deadline. The Nissan Revival Plan was achieved one year ahead of schedule and succeeded in reducing their purchasing costs by 20 % which meant that they approximately reached the level of Renault. The large emphasis Ghosn placed on the execution also gave him an edge as this phase is much more demanding in terms of communication, meeting objectives on time and budget, potential conflicts with power resources and resistance to change. The respect Ghosn showed for the Japanese culture was vital for the initiatives to succeed, even though I believe it was a mistake for him not to learn about Japan before coming there as it is very easy unintended to insult people from other cultures if you are not familiar with their specific customs, but it also gave him an edge in being open-minded in perceiving the Japanese and Nissan culture. Coming to Japan he only brought three principles of management with him were to be well received and understood by employees: transparency, execution vs. strategy; improving quality and customer satisfaction and reducing costs. Not just anybody could have managed the Nissan turnaround as well as Ghosn did. For instance, A COO from Japan would not have been able to cut back on keiretsu investments. Because of the Japanese business culture to make these kinds of investments and the Japanese emphasis on cooperation and loyalty, it would have been considered to be a sort of betrayal and ultimately would 3 have harmed the Nissan brand even more. Only an outsider with different cultural background could legitimize such a change. The resistance Ghosn eventually faced when ignoring the almost sacred tradition of promoting by education, age and time within the company would likewise have been much more pronounced if the initiative came from a Japanese COO. Resistance to change Ultimately some sort of resistance was inevitable because of the major structural and cultural changes Nissan was facing with Ghosn as COO. People generally do not resist change, per se. but some underlying causes, like lack of understanding, fear of the unknown or fear of an outcome worse than the present situation.1 In this specific case Ghosn went a long way implementing many changes before meeting actual resistance in form of lack of cooperation among employees caused by the elimination of the old promotion system, allowing younger, less experienced employees to be promoted based on their skills and achievements. This resistance was clearly caused by fear of the unknown and fear of loosing/not gaining status by promotions. Resistance is generally a very important form of feedback and Ghosn chose to view the resistance as an opportunity for experience rather than a limitation.2 1 Dent, E. B. and Goldberg, S. G. (1999). Page 26 2 Ford, J. D. and Ford, L. W. (2009). Page 101 3 Nohria, N., Joyce, W. and Roberson, B.(2003). Page 45 4 Ford, J. D. and Ford, L. W. (2009). Page 100 Ghosn has overcome the actual resistance and prevented potential resistance to the cultural and structural changes in large by clearly communicating all initiatives and objectives to all Nissan employees. Communication had previously been a problem within the company but by creating a matrix structure (combining efficiency and effectiveness) and through consistency between his own actions, thoughts and communication Ghosn was making sure that transparency as well as communication within the organization was improved and afterwards maintained, keeping focus on the strategy.3 Likewise by creating the Cross-Functional Teams, he sought to build engagement and participation and made sure that the employees would have a sense of ownership over the Nissan Revival Plan and motivate communication across departments, stimulate future risk-taking and responsibility as well as regaining confidence in the companys future. Mitigating resistance by involvement and communication are generally very e ffective and will increase employee commitment to execution.4 4 The former lack of accountability and acceptance of responsibility among employees was eliminated by directly assigning responsibility and accountability and encourage people to take risks. This was accomplished in part by monetary rewards and stock options whenever the actions led to increase in operating profits or revenues.5 The previous consensus mentality at Nissan seems to have been: à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢If everyone one is responsible then no one is accountable, and nobody gets punished,à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- which was affecting risk-taking and slowing decision-making processes across the company. 5 Fu, Dean and Millikin, john P. page C553 Organizational culture As mentioned above, the understanding and respect Ghosn expressed for the Japanese Nissan culture and the fact that he communicated his wish to work through this culture were vital for his acceptance within the organization. He made it clear from the very beginning that he too had a personal stake in the outcome and thereby created a sense of cohesion with the employees. His visibility in the organization from day one and the consistency between his communications and actions was a new but welcome change that made him human in the eyes of the employees. This transparency and consistency together with his explicit promise to respect the culture also helped building a sense trust and thereby employee support for most of Ghosns change initiatives. The Nissan president and CEO, Yoshikazu Hanawa, had a positive attitude towards Ghosn and his experience and abilities in turnarounds, since he explicitly asked Renault to send Ghosn to Nissan to lead the changes. But because Ghosn was a foreigner and not accustomed to the Japanese way of doing business, several industrial business analytics expressed scepticism and concern for this arrangement. It is likely that middle-managers and higher-level-managers have been influenced by these critics and therefore had a negative attitude towards Ghosn as COO, but if they did, they did not make much fuss about it. 5 National culture When you consider the differences between Ghosns leadership style and the Japanese (Nissan) way of doing business, it is actually a bit of an achievement that resistance did not arise earlier and more pronounced than it did. The cultural differences between Ghosn, with his experience in working in organizations with strong corporate cultures, and the Nissan organization, with its weak culture traits, were very pronounced and had great potential to cause some trouble along the way, but it takes two to tango, and one of them has to lead. The initiative of putting together Cross-Functional Teams had great potential for meeting resistance in part because of the Japanese tradition of reaching consensus when making decisions. In addition, if every member of a Cross-Functional Team had to make sure, that their respective departments were supporting every suggestion, then the decision-making process would not only have been slowed severely but would have staled. It is also very likely that the employees at Nissan would have resisted the Cross-Functional Team initiatives because of the Japanese culture of loyalty and cooperation within departments but not necessarily across departments (especially not in troubled times) caused by the weak organizational culture. Early on Ghosn became aware that in order to turn Nissan around, he would have to address some of these cultural issues in order to get to root of the problems and meet the overall goal of creating profits. First and foremost, he would have to communicate and make understood the importance of meeting customer wants and needs (included a radical change in the decision-making processe).6 The management would have to create a shared vision (or long-term plan as opposed to their usual sort-term). Management at Nissan was displaying tunnel vision and was focusing on regaining market share instead of increasing margins and product innovation to meet customer demands.7 The emphasis placed on informal contacts and information, complicated knowledge sharing across the organization, as nothing was written or formally communicated, which also slowed decision-making processes. He would have to overcome these cultural obstacles (underlying problems) before addressing the real problems at Nissan. 6 Nohria, N., Joyce, W. and Roberson, B.(2003). Page 46-47 7 Fu, Dean and Millikin, john P. page C549 6 Luck and timing The timing for these changes was absolutely perfect. Had Ghosn and his Cross-Functional Teams tried to implement the same changes a few years earlier, they would most likely have met great resistance and possible failure. But because of the resent bankruptcy of the major financial house, Yamaichi, and the lack of bailout by the Japanese government, the employees at Nissan began to take their situation seriously and this imposed a sense of urgency among the employees. This sense of urgency helped push changes by making the employees more willing to cooperate and implement the proposed changes as well as taking more risks in order to turn the company around. This willingness for taking risks decreased the previous fear of making decisions (especially faulty decisions) which decreased the need for consensus decision-making , which again increased the speed with which decisions was able to be made. This further fostered motivation for innovative proposals for the product line, which had a positive effect on the Nissan competiveness and on consumer satisfaction. In short, the bankruptcy of Yamaichi was a stroke of luck at the exact right time to help kick-start the major changes at Nissan, especially in the minds of the employees. Looking forward In the next few years (2005) Ghosn will have to return to Renault to take over as CEO (his lifelong dream). The right replacement for his job must ensure continuous growth and success, keeping focus on customer needs and increases in profit as well as to nurture the newly accomplished sense of urgency to keep driving employees towards continuous improvements (Nissan 180). A successor should, besides the above mentioned, be able to create a balance between long-term and short-term objectives to ensure that employees do not fall back into old habits.8 Constantly setting short-term objectives, aligning them with long-term objectives will enhance motivation among Nissan employees as they will see their effort and hard work paying of. 8 Griswold, H. M. and Prenovitz, S. C.(1993). Page 5 9 Krackhardt, D. and Hanson, J. R.(1993). I would recommend Ghosn to use the network analysis9 as a tool for helping him making the best possible decision, ensuring that the person he will choose is trustworthy among employees, accountable and responsible, has influential power. The friendship network is always a good place to start, but he should be sure to mad both the communication network and advice network as well. Perhaps there will be an obvious overlap between the three. 7 Conclusion The Nissan turnaround was a great success in that it met measurable objectives and accomplished to overall strategic goal of increasing profits within the schedule. By approaching the Japanese and corporate Nissan culture with an open mind, Ghosn was able to gain the employees trust. His approach to the cultural differences combined with a great stroke of luck, turned the challenge into and opportunity and he was thereby able to meet the overall goal. In facing the fundamental problems within the organization; lack of clear profit orientation, insufficient focus on customers and too much on competitors, lack of a sense of urgency, no shared vision or common long-term plan, lack of cross-functional, cross-border, cross-cultural lines of work, he had to bend the rules of engagement by changing large parts of the Nissan culture. More specifically, based on the recommendations from the Cross-Functional Teams, he implemented some rather radical changes on the Japanese traditions of doing business, in order to help Nissan get back on track. Even though he was hereby violating his prior commitment to be sensitive to the Nissan culture, he did not experience serious resistance in doing so, because it was ultimately Nissan employees suggesting these changes, he was just executing them. In choosing his Successor Ghosn should map the informal networks within the organization, emphasising on trust, accountability and power to create change. 8 List of literature  · Dent, E. B. and Goldberg, S. G. (1999). Challenging resistance to change. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 35(1), 25-41.  · Ford, J. D. and Ford, L. W. (2009). à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Decoding resistance to change.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- Harvard Business Review, 87(4), 99-103.  · Fu, Dean and Millikin, john P. (2003) à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢The Global Leadership of Carlos Ghosn at Nissan,à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- Thunderbird The American Graduate School of International Management, C546 C556  · Griswold, H. M. and Prenovitz, S. C.(1993).à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢How to translate strategy into operational results.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- Business Forum, 18(3), 5-9.  · Krackhardt, D. and Hanson, J. R.(1993).à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Informal networks: the company behind the chart.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- Harvard Business Review, July/August, 104-111.  · Nohria, N., Joyce, W. and Roberson, B.(2003).à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬ ¢What really works.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬- Harvard Business Review, 81(7), 42-52.

Individuals That Contributed To The Civil War Essay -- essays papers

Individuals That Contributed To The Civil War The Civil War was brought about by many important people, some that wanted to preserve and some that wanted to eradicate the primary cause of the war, slavery. There were the political giants, such as Abraham Lincoln, and Stephen Douglas. There were seditious abolitionists such as John Brown, escaped slaves such as Dred Scott, and abolitionist writers like Harriet Beecher Stowe. These were the people who, ultimately, brought a beginning to the end of what Lincoln called â€Å"a moral, a social, and a political wrong†(Oates 66). Southern states, including the 11 states that formed the Confederacy, depended on slavery to support their economy. Southerners used slave labor to produce crops, especially cotton. Although slavery was illegal in the Northern states, only a small proportion of Northerners actively opposed it. The main debate between the North and the South on the eve of the war was whether slavery should be permitted in the Western territories recently acquired during the Mexican war, which included New Mexico, part of California, and Utah. â€Å"Opponents of slavery were concerned about its expansion, in part because they did not want to compete against slave labor†(Oates 15). In 1851, a literary event startled the country. Harriet Beecher Stowe, an American writer and abolitionist, wrote an antislavery novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, that was published serially in a newspaper and in book form in 1852. â€Å"It was a forceful indictment of slavery and one of the most powerful novels of its kind in American literature. The success of the book was unprecedented, selling 500,000 copies in the United States alone within five years, and it was translated into more than 20 foreign languages†(Oates 29). It was widely read in the States and abroad, and moved many to join the cause of abolition. The South indignantly denied this indictment of slavery. â€Å"Stowe’s book increased partisan feeling over slavery and intensified sectional differences. It did much to solidify militant antislavery attitude in the North, and therefore was an important factor in the start of the American Civil War†(Oates 31). In 1854, Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which created the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, and stated that each territory could be admitted as a state â€Å"with... ... Instead they joined the lower South with the secession of Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee. This secession by the South lead to the opening to the American Civil War. The war over slavery was brought about by many important people, who used many different ways to express their points of view. Some exhibited their dissatisfaction with slavery by debating, some by using violence, some by suing in court, and some by writing a story. These were all effective strikes against the South, and primary causes of the war. In conclusion, these people ultimately brought a beginning to the end of what Lincoln called, â€Å"a moral, a social, and a political wrong†(Oates 66). Bibliography Bradford, Ned. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Appleton-Century Inc., New York. 1956. Oates, Stephen B. The Whirlwind of War. Harper Collins Publishers, New York. 1998. Woodworth, Steven E. Davis and Lee at War. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. 1995. â€Å"Emancipation Proclamation†. http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Lincoln/emancipate. html â€Å"Jefferson Davis to Congress of the Confederate States†. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pjdavis/620225.html

Agency Costs and Financial Decision-Making

Agency Costs and Financial Decision-Making The Concept An agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers and they may have divergent goals and objectives, and there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen, Michael C. , and William H.Meckling. â€Å"Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. † Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October 1976), 305-360) The concept of agency cost recognizes there are fundamental differences in how shareholders, managers, and even bondholders interpret their respective relationships to an organization. While they may share some common goals and objectives, there is the potential for at least some objectives to emerge that are focused more on individual enrichment than on the well-being of the whole.For example, managers may be more focused on building a reputation for themselves, possibly creating their own power bases within the structure of the larger organizations. Shareholders may become more focused on earning dividends now and less on the future of the business. Bondholders may be concerned only with the project associated with the bond issue, and lose sight of how the overall stability of the company can have a negative impact on the return earned from that bond. ( http://www. referenceforbusiness. com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Agency-Theory. tml#ixzz14WVaUW4g) Agency Costs is an economic concept which is defined as the cost incurred by an entity in relation to issues like varied goals and objectives of the management and shareholders and information asymmetry. Self-Interested Behavior Agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize th eir own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders. Agents have the ability to operate in their own self-interest rather than in the best interests of the firm because of asymmetric information (e. g. , managers know better than shareholders whether they are apable of meeting the shareholders' objectives) and uncertainty (e. g. , myriad factors contribute to final outcomes, and it may not be evident whether the agent directly caused a given outcome, positive or negative). Evidence of self-interested managerial behavior includes the consumption of some corporate resources in the form of perquisites and the avoidance of optimal risk positions, whereby risk-averse managers bypass profitable opportunities in which the firm's shareholders would prefer they invest. Outside investors recognize that the firm will make decisions contrary to their best interests.Accordingly, investors will discount the prices they are willing to pay for the firm's securities. (Bamberg, Giinter, and Klau s Spremann, eds. Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987). A potential agency conflict arises whenever the manager of a firm owns less than 100 percent of the firm's common stock. If a firm is a sole proprietorship managed by the owner, the owner-manager will undertake actions to maximize his or her own welfare. The owner-manager will probably measure utility by personal wealth, but may trade off other considerations, such as leisure and perquisites, against personal wealth.If the owner-manager forgoes a portion of his or her ownership by selling some of the firm's stock to outside investors, a potential conflict of interest, called an agency conflict, arises. For example, the owner-manager may prefer a more leisurely lifestyle and not work as vigorously to maximize shareholder wealth, because less of the wealth will now accrue to the owner-manager. In addition, the owner-manager may decide to consume more perquisites, because some of the cost of th e consumption of benefits will now be borne by the outside shareholders. Bamberg, Giinter, and Klaus Spremann, eds. Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987. ) In the majority of large publicly traded corporations, agency conflicts are potentially quite significant because the firm's managers generally own only a small percentage of the common stock. Therefore, shareholder wealth maximization could be subordinated to an assortment of other managerial goals. For instance, managers may have a fundamental objective of maximizing the size of the firm.By creating a large, rapidly growing firm, executives increase their own status, create more opportunities for lower- and middle-level managers and salaries, and enhance their job security because an unfriendly takeover is less likely. As a result, incumbent management may pursue diversification at the expense of the shareholders who can easily diversify their individual portfolios simply by buying shares in other companies. (http://www. referenceforbusiness. com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Agency-Theory. html#ixzz14WVaUW4g) Managers can be encouraged to act in the stockholders' best interests through incentives, constraints, and punishments.These methods, however, are effective only if shareholders can observe all of the actions taken by managers. A moral hazard problem, whereby agents take unobserved actions in their own self-interests, originates because it is infeasible for shareholders to monitor all managerial actions. To reduce the moral hazard problem, stockholders must incur agency costs. Measuring Agency Costs The idea behind assessing agency cost is to attempt to identify what impact these differences in objectives and the flow of information between the agent or manager and the shareholders is having on the overall profitability of the organization.By correctly identifying and addressing issues of agency cost, it is possible to minimize the influence of those factors, at least enough to allow the organization to continue moving forward, rather than running the risk of failure. Determining the agency cost normally begins with looking closely at the potential costs or risks associated with including some type of agent or manager in the organizational structure. For example, one potential risk would be the possibility that the individual who is appointed as an officer in the company could seek to use company assets for his or her own personal gain, to the detriment of the company.At the same time, agency cost also looks at the expense involved in anticipating potential abuses of power and resources, and structuring the organization so that abuse is less likely to occur. This may include offering incentives to key employees that promote loyalty and lessen the chance of misappropriation of resources, or structuring the accounting process so that a series of checks and balances create a separation of control, effectively preventing any one individual from having too much power within the organization. http://www. wisegeek. com/what-is-an-agency-cost. htm) Agency costs are defined as those costs borne by shareholders to encourage managers to maximize shareholder wealth rather than behave in their own self-interests. The notion of agency costs is perhaps most associated with a seminal 1976 Journal of Finance paper by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, who suggested that corporate debt levels and management equity levels are both influenced by a wish to contain agency costs. There are three major types of agency costs: 1) Expenditures to monitor managerial activities, such as audit costs (2) Expenditures to structure the organization in a way that will limit undesirable managerial behavior, such as appointing outside members to the board of directors or restructuring the company's business units and management hierarchy (3) Opportunity costs which are incurred when shareholder-imposed restrictions, such as requirements for shareholder votes on s pecific issues, limit the ability of managers to take actions that advance shareholder wealth.In the absence of efforts by shareholders to alter managerial behavior, there will typically be some loss of shareholder wealth due to inappropriate managerial actions. On the other hand, agency costs would be excessive if shareholders attempted to ensure that every managerial action conformed with shareholder interests. Therefore, the optimal amount of agency costs to be borne by shareholders is determined in a cost-benefit context—agency costs should be increased as long as each incremental dollar spent results in at least a dollar increase in shareholder wealth. (http://www. referenceforbusiness. om/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Agency-Theory. html#ixzz14WVaUW4g) Financial decision making for dealing with agency costs There are two polar positions for dealing with shareholder-manager agency conflicts. At one extreme, the firm's managers are compensated entirely on the basis of stock price cha nges. In this case, agency costs will be low because managers have great incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. It would be extremely difficult, however, to hire talented managers under these contractual terms because the firm's earnings would be affected by economic events that are not under managerial control.At the other extreme, stockholders could monitor every managerial action, but this would be extremely costly and inefficient. The optimal solution lies between the extremes, where executive compensation is tied to performance, but some monitoring is also undertaken. In addition to monitoring, the following mechanisms encourage managers to act in shareholders' interests: (1) performance-based incentive plans (2) direct intervention by shareholders (3) the threat of firing (4) the threat of takeoverMost publicly traded firms now employ performance shares, which are shares of stock given to executives on the basis of performances as defined by financial measures such as earn ings per share, return on assets, return on equity, and stock price changes. If corporate performance is above the performance targets, the firm's managers earn more shares. If performance is below the target, however, they receive less than 100 percent of the shares. Incentive-based compensation plans, such as performance shares, are designed to satisfy two objectives.First, they offer executives incentives to take actions that will enhance shareholder wealth. Second, these plans help companies attract and retain managers who have the confidence to risk their financial future on their own abilities—which should lead to better performance. (http://www. referenceforbusiness. com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Agency-Theory. html#ixzz14WVaUW4g) An increasing percentage of common stock in corporate America is owned by institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds.The institutional money managers have the clout, if they choose, to exert considerable infl uence over a firm's operations. Institutional investors can influence a firm's managers in two primary ways. First, they can meet with a firm's management and offer suggestions regarding the firm's operations. Second, institutional shareholders can sponsor a proposal to be voted on at the annual stockholders' meeting, even if the proposal is opposed by management.Although such shareholder-sponsored proposals are nonbinding and involve issues outside day-to-day operations, the results of these votes clearly influence management opinion. (http://www. referenceforbusiness. com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Agency-Theory. html#ixzz14WVaUW4g) In the past, the likelihood of a large company's management being ousted by its stockholders was so remote that it posed little threat. This was true because the ownership of most firms was so widely distributed, and

Miss Julie: Examining the Nature of Pathos Essay

Miss Julie is an adaptation of August Strindberg’s play – directed and composed by Mike Figgis. Overall, the film remains faithful to the play. However, an indispensable distinction is the addition of a sex scene. After Julie and Jean hear her servants singing a lewd song, they copulate. Because Strindberg’s audience would have had different sensibilities, the act is merely hinted at in the original. For example, Julie says â€Å"there are no barriers between us now† (87) In the film however, the act is explicit, raw, and degrading. In Strindberg’s original, the act stems out of mutual lust, with Julie as the seductress. However, in the film, it is initiated by Jean, out of a desire to ascend social rankings and to see Julie toppled from her pedestal. Hence, the proper term for their act is not â€Å"love-making†, not â€Å"sex†, but – defilement. The net effect achieved by the sound effects, camera angles, and casting invokes pathos towards Julie. After the sex scene, the violin refrain is layered with complex chords in the minor key, conveying a poignant sentiment. Conversely, in the sex scene, the only soundtrack is the ambient noise- the feral panting audible. After the bawdy tune, the fiddling fades, replaced by a violin playing one sustained note in the minor key to augment tension. The music stops just as the camera zooms into Jean’s quarters and the split screen commences. With no music to buffer the debasement on the screen, the audience’s feelings of revulsion are amplified. The camera progresses from medium shots to close-ups of their faces, creating a voyeuristic effect. It trails from Julie’s boots, along her body, to her lips, conveying the intimacy of their union. However, Julie’s eyes are devoid of passion and her porcelain demeanour intermingled with childlike fragility and the sordid nature of the defilement is chilling. The split-screen illustrates the couple from different angles, one closing up on the faces, and the other focused on their bodies. The spasmodic cameras heighten the frenetic atmosphere. As they climax, the two screens close up to their faces and their two perspectives are made one, just as the act of sex unifies perceptions. Another deviation from the play is the difference between the couple in age, appearance, and height. In the play, Miss Julie is 25 and Jean is 30. (1) However, in the film, Jean appears in his fifties, sporting a balding dome and wrinkled forefront. To evoke indignity that Strindberg’s audience would have experienced from solely the status discrepancy, an older man was cast. Moreover, Julie is waifish, with a patrician demeanour and a childlike vulnerability whereas Jean is stout and aging. Jean’s unsightly appearance is an outward manifestation of his inferior status. The height difference symbolizes their class disparity. Before the act, Jean’s face is nestled in her neck. After, Julie is slumped back, literally looking up to him, revealing the power shift that has just taken place, inviting the audience to commiserate with her plight as she wrings her hands in remorse. Works Cited Strindberg, August. Miss Julie and Other Plays, translated by Michael Robinson. Oxford University Press: New York, 1998.